30 October 2009: President Barack Obama's dithering on the troops' surge sought by his Afghan military commander, General Stanley McChrystal, suggests that even if he agrees to the full demand (highly unlikely), he won't have the stomach for a long, incrementing war in Afghanistan (that would require anything from three to six hundred thousand troops to "drain" the Al-Qaeda/ Taliban "swamp", according to some estimates). From a year to eighteen months is as long as can be given, on present evidence, for a heavy US military presence in Afghanistan. Thereafter, conceivably, there would be a light military detachment to service the UAV attacks in South Waziristan and Quetta (assuming that the Pakistan army won't be able and willing to attack the Al-Qaeda/ Afghan Taliban leadership), plus some intelligence detail, and an outside chance of thin special forces garrisoning. But even this light US military deployment is predicated on the happy hope that the Afghan terror war geography will resemble approximately what it is now, which it won't. So rule out that light deployment, and completely obliterate it from thinking if the Taliban ("soft/ hard", "good/ bad") recaptures Kabul and power. Continental United States will come right back on the Al-Qaeda terror radar, but that is well-known and widely accepted, except by some of Obama's advisers, especially his vice-president, Joe Biden, and the defeated presidential candidate, John Kerry.