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C O M M E N T A R Y
Snatching defeat...
There's nothing to be gained by talking to Pakistan at this juncture, and everything to lose, argues N.V.Subramanian.
5 February 2010: There may be said to be three real and one mythical factor behind any decision to commence a dialogue with Pakistan. But dialogue won't end Pakistani terrorism, unless India becomes infirm and gives up Jammu and Kashmir, which in turn will set off a process of Balkanization.
The mythical factor pushing for a dialogue with Pakistan is the so-called Indian Muslim public opinion. Indian Muslims are by and large too poor and worried about their security and their next meal to consider about issues of peace with Pakistan. The mullahs and the pseudo-secular political parties that claim to speak on their behalf (while keeping them backward: the likes of Congress's Digvijay Singh) may advance the Pakistan angle. But to all intents and purposes, it is bogus and non-existent.
It is true that many Indian Muslims have relatives in Pakistan and would generally be averse to an Indo-Pak war. But that would be true of non-Muslims too unless their opinion is sought in the immediate aftermath of a 26/ 11-scale terror attack. And it must be remembered that the 1965 war finally and irrevocably divided Indian and Pakistani Muslims. There was fear that Indian Muslim officers and jawans would hesitate in fighting their Pakistani co-religionists. But the 1965 conflict vanquished those fears. The other result of it was that Pakistan put an end to Muslim migration from India. It could no longer be sure of the loyalty of Indian Muslims to a Muslim state called Pakistan.
Which is why all the Jinnah lionizing by L.K.Advani and now Jaswant Singh produces little or no traction with Indian Muslims. The majority of them (the minority being terrorists trained and handled by Pakistan) do not hold extra-territorial loyalties to Pakistan. They see themselves Indians first and last (although after their Muslim identity) and India as their homeland. So Indian Muslims as a factor propelling Indo-Pak relations does not happen to be true. Deep down, the Pakistanis have contempt for Indian Muslims for their irreversible syncretism.
One of the three real factors is also fast becoming mythical. This is Pakistani terrorism's ability to force India to the negotiating table. Except for the so-called "fidayeen" attack in Srinagar some days ago, India has been remarkably free from major Pakistani terror attacks since 26/ 11, in large measure because of the efforts of the Union home minister, P.Chidambaram. With good reason, Chidambaram has been praised by this writer in this magazine, twice, as it happens, this week. Those Indians that want to push a dialogue with Pakistan say Pakistan has contributed to the terror-reduction against India. It doesn't seem very apparent with the growing tally of foiled terrorist attacks primarily due to Indian preventive measures, with foiled infiltration attempts in J and K, with the conference of terrorists in PoK lead by the terrorist leader, Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed's Jamaat-ul-Dawa, and with the Pakistan prime minister's shameful confession that he has no control over his country's terrorists.
The short point is Chidambaram has secured India from Pakistani terrorism with the political backing of the Congress leadership. The larger point is terrorism as an instrument is no longer as successful for Pakistan against India as it was before. This achieved and still more achievable freedom from Pakistani terrorism cannot and should not be squandered, and any talks with Pakistan, when Pakistan desperately sues for it, should be restricted to counter-terrorism and efforts to strengthen and deepen Pakistan's democracy. Nothing else is negotiable and certainly not J and K. That time when Pakistan is brought to its knees will come. Patience and fortitude is required. Meanwhile, Chidambaram needs to do a no-holds-barred clean-up job of Indian jihadis. Sensational revelations have come in the Batla House encounter case, and the Congress leadership should abandon any votebank considerations and give Chidambaram a free hand. Chidambaram knows what to do.
Factor three is international pressure on India to negotiate with Pakistan, and the media is highlighting it in the present context of India's offer of "limited" talks with Pakistan. This pressure has grown or diminished in the past depending on India's reception of it. The worst that has happened when India has not been very receptive to international pressure is rising Pakistani terrorism against India (on which we have a handle now) and peaking disputations about J and K (which India has withstood too time and again). On the other hand, India's rebuff of international pressure has not affected its growth or the benignity with which its rise is accepted. If anything, the West has factored in Pakistani terrorism in India's growth story, and won't be scared away in consequence of it. Post 9/ 11, no part of the world is safe, and political and security establishments are trying hard to keep ahead of terrorists. India is no different. So if India once again refuses to buckle to Western/ US pressure to negotiate with Pakistan, Heaven's won't fall. To flag one issue out of several, more and more states will line up to do civilian nuclear trade with India, and the anxieties there should be limited to containing and defeating the US's non-proliferation agenda. Typically, a dialogue with Pakistan or its absence makes no material difference to the dynamic of India's rise.
Finally, the fourth factor, which is Pakistan's capacity to despoil India's strategic-humanitarian investments in Afghanistan. This writer has long given up on this investment, worth $1.3 billion, which would remain intact till US and NATO troops remain in Afghanistan. And they won't remain after US president Barack Obama's July 2011 deadline. What the London conference on Afghanistan did was to approve plans to bribe the Taliban and split it, in which Pakistan has agreed to play a role. Its real purpose, hardly concealed, is to facilitate the Taliban/ Al-Qaeda capture of Afghan central power (at best tenuous if the opposed Northern Alliance rises again backed by India, Russia, Iran and some others), and use that against India. The problem for Pakistan, aside from any emerged Northern Alliance - II (which has been analyzed in earlier commentaries), is that the Taliban has seen through the Pakistan game, loathes the ISI, and the Al-Qaeda may see the exit of US troops from Afghanistan as the signal to go after Pakistan's nukes. A dialogue with Pakistan does not impact on/ assist in any of these developments/ calculations. If anything, it may be taken by Pakistan as weakness, and it would complicate and harden Chidambaram's job.
As said in the middle of this piece, India needs to cultivate patience and fortitude. Fortune is slowly swinging its way. Pakistan will growingly face the terrorism of its own terror instruments, and sooner or later, it will seek India's assistance for survival. The waiting for such a time is sensible, in the course of which India must secure itself from Pakistani terrorism, move to a military philosophy of offensive defense, and place every accent on growth and internal equitability. Victory is at hand. Talking now to Pakistan amounts to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi).
Please visit N.V.Subramanian's blog http://courtesanofstorms.blog.com/ and write to him at envysub@gmail.com
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