8 October 2007: India has surrendered its moral claim to regional leadership by clinging to its narrow national interests and keeping a diplomatic silence over the brutal suppression of a popular unrest by Myanmar’s military junta. When the entire world has been looking toward India and China to make the junta see reason, India reflects inaction by saying the “dialogue for reconciliation must continue”. Even ASEAN, which avoided taking a stand on the pretext of non-interference in internal affairs and sought constructive engagement, has called the actions of the junta “repulsive”. India’s inaction not only shows its utter impotence in influencing regional affairs, but also reveals its inability to plan multiple policy options, the hallmark of a well-conceived foreign policy.

India’s strategic interests in Myanmar are to curb North East insurgency, access its market through border trade, gain a share of its abundant gas reserves to meet growing energy needs, and counter China’s increasing military influence. India not only has a long land and maritime boundary with Myanmar, but Myanmar is also its only land bridge to South East Asia. India has done everything to cultivate warm relations with the junta, developing ports, building roads and railways, and been competing with China for its oil and gas reserves as part of its "Look East Policy".

But anyone familiar with foreign policy-making knows that relationships solely based on state-to-state or regime-to-regime ties never sustain. To endure, they must take into account the wishes and aspirations of the people. India’s Myanmar policy appears totally divorced from popular will. Had India factored in the democratic aspirations of the people and their high regard for Aung San Suu Kyi, its warm relations with the military junta could have helped it mediate in Myanmar. This would have required a master stroke of diplomacy, but it seems India never tried. Our security establishments, not particularly known for subtle diplomacy, have hijacked the Myanmar policy. This is a serious lapse on the part of India’s political elite and foreign policy mandarins.

Even that lapse could be forgiven had India secured major leverage and strategic depth in Myanmar. It hasn’t. Our trade with Myanmar has increased in recent years but it is miniscule compared to China’s. We export six times more than we import. India has signed a number of gas contracts with Myanmar but no gas has reached here. Gas from explored Arakan blocks has been sold to China despite India’s GAIL and ONGC buying a thirty per cent stake in them. India claims to be getting help from the Burmese army to fight North East insurgents mainly based in Myanmar's Sagaing Division. To secure the one thousand seven hundred kilometre border and flush out insurgents, India has provided military aid and training to the Myanmarese Army. But the gains are minimal and insurgency and terrorist activities in the North East continue. The Burmese army has not conducted a major operation against the rebels like Bhutan did in 2003. In August last, over British protests, India transferred two BN-2 Defender Islander maritime surveillance aircraft, arms and T-55 tanks to Myanmar, despite the junta having supported insurgency to leverage Indian support away from Suu Kyi's pro-democracy movement.

Any Indian travelling through Yangon, Mandalay and other commercial centres, as I was doing in early August, a few days before the popular unrest, is struck by the lack of Indian connectivity and presence. Myanmar remains a distant neighbour. None of the vital links established in the past and broken during the Ne Win regime are visible today. China looms large politically, economically and strategically. Our bureaucratic inertia and inept diplomacy are responsible. India is only visible in the cultural and social traditions of the Burmese, and that makes India’s absence in the political and economic sphere more conspicuous.

A major casualty of India’s good relations with the junta is India's image as the world's largest democracy. Many ASEAN countries believe that the junta is reluctant to concede to the democratic opposition despite some Western sanctions because it gets legitimacy from India and China. China is subtly encouraging the regime to change. Earlier this month, senior Chinese diplomat Tang Jiaxun told the Myanmarese foreign minister, "China wholeheartedly hopes that Myanmar will push forward a (democratic) process that is appropriate for the country." China also hosted and facilitated talks between US and Burmese representatives some weeks ago.

Were a democratic government to come to power in Myanmar, it may not look kindly at India for having “abandoned” democracy. Such a change is remote. But even while pragmatically engaging the junta to boost economic and political relations and to counter China, it is essential to calibrate policies to be able to nudge the regime towards democratization.

This requires nuanced diplomacy alongwith ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member. Some within ASEAN have even spoken of expelling Myanmar. The international community is also putting pressure on the regime through the United Nations whose point man on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, has recently visited the country and met with the generals and Suu Kyi. China too, obsessed with making the coming Olympics a grand success and not prone to offending the international community, may be willing to push the junta for political reform.

So this is the most opportune moment for India. Having urged the junta to free Suu Kyi, India must be able to convince the regime that keeping her under house arrest is counterproductive. The next step should be to persuade the regime to begin political reconciliation and to assist Suu Kyi with that process so that both legitimate civilian and military interests are protected. India can play the same role of mediator as China did in the case of North Korea. India can broker between the Myanmar regime on one hand and the United States and EU on the other for a junta-opposition power sharing arrangement. India must rise to the occasion and establish its moral claim to leadership in the region.

Dr Baladas Ghoshal is Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.